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Examining Collective Action among Mieso Agropastoralists of Eastern Ethiopia
Introduction
Being trapped in chronic poverty due to environmental change, resource scarcity and conflicts
(Fekadu, et al., 2001), agropastoralists organize collective action as an option to cope with such
livelihood-threatening factors and the effects they are producing. An increasing pressure on water
resources and livestock watering points has altered the relationships among user groups and the
use of such resources. Absence of water development projects, indicating marginalization of
agropastoralists in the past, has contributed to such pressure. Some studies show that such lack of
opportunities to grasp government attention is partly related to lack of knowledge about their
highly localized specific circumstances (Kassa, 2001; Gebre, 2001). However, knowledge of their
local collective action in resource management practices serves as entry point for designing
appropriate policies and interventions. In the year 2002, the regional government put water
harvesting as a principal local action in overcoming the disastrous effect of drought or prolonged
dry season in this food insecure community. Such activity has been organized collectively.
Highly interdependent collective action in establishing water wells is also common before the
government initiative was in place. Broadly seen, collective action in natural resource
management is one of the policy agenda widely supported to enable the poor achieve multiple
goals that cannot be achieved individually due to capacity limitation.
The purpose of this paper is to examine collective action institutions in water harvesting and
water well maintenance among Mieso agropastoralists of Eastern Ethiopia. Most studies
undertaken by IFPRI scholars focus on the role of collective action in various group activities in2
the smallholder sedentary farming areas of the highlands. This case addresses a different
production system where agropastoralists are semi-sedentary and mobility forms part of their
livelihood systems. Our finding reflects on new aspects not examined by these scholars. In
addition, we will try to uncover the likely effect of some of the collective action institutions
1 on
well-being of marginal group members. Such effect depends on the type of incentive structure
affecting members’ contribution decisions. To achieve this objective, data were collected through
observation, focus group discussions with different stakeholders at community level and
individual in-depth interviews with selected households. At each level, we used different
respondent selection criteria. Guided by specific theoretical variables vital for such empirical
work, data were collected on 1) dynamics of collective action institutions, and their variability
along with resource conditions and 2) disparity in institutional incentives for different members
of the group.
Purposes and analytical challenges: A review
 While Olson (1965) and Hardin (1982) have done a pioneering work in developing theories of
collective action, others building on their work indicate that collective action can be organized for
different purposes. Needless to mention all, some include an incentive for technology adoption
(Knox, et al., 1998; Place and Swallow, 2000), designing and enforcement of institutions
(Ostrom, 1990), improving management of rangeland resources through institutional change
supporting devolution (Ngaido and Kirk, 2001), common property management (Runge, 1986)
and provision of local public goods (McCarthy, 2004).
1 We use the terms ‘institutions’ and ‘rules’ interchangeably.3
The above authors review not only the purposes of collective action but also provide information
on behavior of individuals within a group, which is equally essential for its success. Along this,
Baland and Platteau (2002) have extensively reviewed the impact of members’ inequality on the
prospects of collective action with specific reference to the use of common property resources.
They point out that inequality can create sufficient incentives for better-endowed members to
incur the costs involved in such action. Furthermore, understanding overall characteristics at
group level are also vital. With respect to this Lin and Nugent (1995), based on premise laid
down in Olson’s static game (i.e. group size, homogeneity, membership period, physical
proximity, level of goal differentiation and inequality in wealth or power among participants),
elaborate further on the theoretical variables affecting collective action. They indicate that the
time group members spent together and ‘geographical or sectoral concentration’ make the nature
of collective action more dynamic. The level of social capital created horizontally or vertically,
through determining social relationships, can facilitate or constrain such action (Meinzen-Dick, et
al, 2004). In their view, while level of collective action (specific group or wider community)
corresponds to type of social capital required, the purpose of specific action dictates choices of a
unique type of indicators or criteria to assess the outcome.
In addition to these, environmental circumstances in which members find themselves, availability
of ‘political entrepreneurship’, success or failure of other similar groups and knowledge of
technology of collective action on the part of the group members and leaders influence the
success of collective action (Lin and Nugent, 1995). Their argument focuses on collective action
imposed or advocated by the state rather than self-organized. Nevertheless, state facilitated
collective action may create group legitimacy in the form of organization, which in turn makes4
participation stricter (ibid. 2326). In this case, it will not be clear whether participation is benefit-
driven or just fear of punishment making institutional incentives undistinguishable.
Most literature on collective action draws on the problem of social dilemma even if rules, through
inducing behavioral prediction, can reduce the extent of such dilemma. In this regard,
embeddedness of motivational heterogeneity, expressed in the form of linear altruism and
inequity-aversion among actors, produce varied levels of utility for participants (Ahn, et al,
2003). Such unpredictability of members’ behavior attributed to multiple factors has increased
the complexity of collective action analysis (Ostrom, 2005). The two concepts –altruism and
inequity-aversion - can further help scrutinize individual behavioral irregularity in joining
collective action and distinguish actors in terms of their decisions. Moreover, collective action
itself is affected by type of goods (public or common) and prevailing property rights (Ostrom,
2003). Conversely, understanding the role of collective action in enforcing different forms of
property rights in circumstances when multiple sources of rights to a resource exist is also
essential (Meinzen-Dick, et al. 2004). In their view ‘lack of secure access to resources’ is one of
the principal factors undermining participation of the poor in collective action. Overall, the above
theories convey the fact that collective action provides a means to have access to vital resources,
improve resource conditions and enforce ‘rules of the game’ for action through producing
“selective incentives”
2.
None of the above scholarly works has made an explicit attempt to link collective action and
poverty. Despite this gap in focus by the existing literature, a limited number of studies linking
local institutions and well-being have recently emerged. Grootaert and Narayan (2004) have
2 While positive selective incentives can encourage members’ participation, negative selective incentives discourage
free-riding in the form of violating group decisions (Lin and Nugent, 1995:2331).5
found that households’ investment in social capital, as measured by making use of its different
dimensions, results in “increased welfare and poverty reduction”. Such impact was greater for the
poor than non-poor. Similarly, Barrett and Lee (2004) emphasize on institutional arrangements
for reconciling rural poverty reduction with renewable natural resource conservation in
developing countries. Their synthesis of various cases reflect that conservation projects of similar
basic design have shown different results due to variable degree of the functioning of rules across
different communities. They indicate choice of rules being less important than the way the
community monitors and enforces them.
There is a growing interest to analyze collective action institutions at higher level. In this regard,
the work of Bastiaensen, et al. (2005) reveals that institutions can pave the way to “poverty
reduction or reproduction”. They do these by enhancing people’s representation in the political
process and the way such a process gives guarantee to their resource entitlements. Departing from
a “social-constructivist” view, they suggest for the need to relate collective action institutions to
Sen’s capability approach in order to see the effect of institutions at individual other than mere
aggregate level. This makes sense if poverty reduction role of collective action has to be more
explicit and the “redistribution” function of institutions (Lin and Nugent, 1995) should get
sufficient emphasis. All these authors hold a common position in addressing the role of
institutions in influencing human organization at different levels for collective action in order to
improve societal welfare.6
Analytical Approach
We have critically reviewed and compared transcripts from a two round seven focus group
discussions with various stakeholders with information from individual in-depth interviews. We
chose this step in order to elicit how groups’ rules and norms affect individual members. We have
selected several groups of different sizes and institutional arrangements organized to manage
water resources. Since we try to compare variation in institutional choices and incentives across
groups in different context, we employed a qualitative analysis approach.
 Results and Discussion
1. Sources of collective action
Two sources of collective action are predominant in these districts: 1) internal or self-organized
and 2) externally initiated and facilitated. Both sources are aiming at managing different
resources. Characterizing them in terms of certain factors broadens our understanding of their
feature. Among these factors, we observe that the origin of institutions influences other factors
such as enforcement mechanisms and sanctioning. Enforcement and sanctioning would be easier
when the origin of rules is cultural norms other than regional or district administration. This is
because members respect for clan leaders and elders is much higher than that of government
change agents. The following table gives a comparison of both.7
Table 1: Characteristics of two sources of collective action
Factors Internal External
Coordinators Clan leaders and elders
Village chief and extension
agents
Origin of institutions (or rules) Cultural norms and religion
Regional or district
administration
Sustainability of action Relatively sustainable
Changes when policy or
regime changes
Enforcement mechanism Group influence
Continuous Monitoring by
chief
Sanction mechanism Temporary exclusion from access Fines or jails
Water harvesting and water-well maintenance are the widely organized group activities. While
the former makes part of the local government initiated program, the latter has long existed and it
is entirely based on people’s initiative. Being a season dependent activity, water harvesting
enables the group to produce private good-water required to supplement field crops and livestock
watering. Harvested water will not remain common good as mobilized labor only harvests water
for each member on a rotating basis. The benefit from the harvested water can vary across
member households. We have identified four reasons for this: quantity of water harvested per day
per farm, availability of suitable space for collection, technical capacity to store the harvested
water for an extended period, and the purpose to which they put water.8
2. Participation, membership and incentives
Variation in incentive structure among members is inevitable. In our case, such variation did not
cause disparity in participation level among members. We observe that poor members are equally
involved since their community members do either cultivate their farm or provide oxen traction
power on a rotating basis. Elders and village leaders coordinate in mobilizing labor for such
activity as well as provision of oxen power to the poor members. Hence, membership is not
limited based on wealth or asset endowments since informal institutions play great role in sharing
assets among participants. This is not a fixed phenomenon. In similar study site, there are
differences in terms of risk-pooling practices in maintaining the poor as members. Different
incentive structures exist. In cases where members’ contribution of oxen has increasingly led to a
decline in poor members each year, it produces a positive incentive for non-member poor
households to join the group in subsequent years. Such a system creates an incentive for capable
but poor households. In a reverse situation, poor members will continue to drop membership.
This shows that social capital creates incentives for participation of poor agropastoral households.
The summary of statistics for incentives to remain member ranges from expectation of benefits
(99%), being a leading factor, to fear of fines (21%). Other middle ground incentives for
participation are members’ encouragement (76%) and intimacy (88%). The expectation of benefit
flows is greater for the self-organized activities, whereas fear of fines is a disincentive that
imposed collective action produces for some members. This is not, however, contrary to the fact
that many poor members still expect benefits from being a member through acquiring assets from
economically better-off members.9
Moreover, there are heterogeneous views among members when it comes to the possibility to
generate benefits of participation. Farm location, environmental uncertainty and fatalism
contingent to past drought shocks are among the key factors causing such disparity in views. Poor
techniques of water harvesting and storing, inadequate extension service, random grouping of
members, large nature of group size, and government resettlement schemes are impediments for
realizing desirable collective action outcomes. All these factors seem to have affected the
likelihood of collective action institutions in improving well-being on sustainable basis. The key
observation here is even if there is strong social cohesion, which is theoretically expected to
reduce costs of organizing collective action, the costs and benefits at community level are
incomparable when drought shocks disrupt the production system. Costs are much higher.
3. Resource size and unstable membership
Collective action on maintenance of water wells exhibit a different characteristics from water
harvesting in that the good remains common property resource where production and
consumption is organized communally.  One example where collective action failed is that the
size of a group using and maintaining water wells has reduced in the last 10 to 15 years leading to
abandoning of larger wells. Both resource size and group size have declined. The main reasons
include: 1) poor cooperation of members due to their migration in search for better grazing, 2)
loss of herd by many households during drought shocks and 3) lack of fairness in the exploitation
rules for participant members since non-members also use it. All these factors contributed to the
loss of common goods of larger size. The first two factors are the principal reasons for a fall in
cooperation for collective action in maintaining water well. This is theoretically valid, as these
factors seem to have substantially reduced members’ dependence on the resource. The third10
reason is weakened by the fact that benefits flows from one to the next household members in a
village creates a difficulty in interpreting collective action merely on individual cost-benefit
basis. For instance, neighbors share livestock and livestock products informally, giving a chance
for the poor to benefit from group action without being involved in the production of goods.
Cultural norms influence the haves not to constrain poor members’ access to livestock products.
McCarthy (2004) points out the costliness of managing such incentive structure, as members tend
to play a prisoners’ dilemma game, in that everyone tries to free ride whether the others are
contributing or not. This has not been a problem in the case of water harvesting since exclusion is
automatic when one tends to free ride merely due to the nature of good produced and the
institutional environment adopted, operating on ‘reciprocity’ basis.
In another instance, participation of members is dynamic and elders monitor the continuity of
members’ labor contribution each year. Rules of access to the resource vary in accordance with
the frequency of active participation. They are generally stricter for large herders showing
continued non-participation compared with small herders, but they are impartial irrespective of
variation among members in stock size and contribution level. From this, we understand that
culturally supported institutional mechanisms of isolating one from the other by relying on these
factors have not existed or are morally unacceptable. This signifies the positive impact of
collective rules in improving access to water point for the poor. Here we make two points. First,
cultural and economic factors have interdependent effect in determining stability of membership
of each individual in maintaining water-wells. Second, unpredictability of benefit flows from the
well due to environmental variability is the principal reason for discontinuity of membership of
most households. This is because the water level extremely reduces in prolonged dry season. This11
means the resource attribute, by influencing members’ expectation of benefit, determines their
participation.
Conclusion
We tried to examine how marginal agropastoralists organize collective action. The findings show
that the source of collective action is less important than other variables especially the number of
participants and size of resource. The larger the resource size the less stable the participation of
members irrespective of the source. Moreover, differences in asset possession, which is
theoretically presumed to constrain involvement, do not affect poor households’ participation in
collective action when the existing social capital enables the poor to benefit from jointly
produced goods through making use of assets from relatively rich members.
However, such substitutability of social capital for physical asset is possible only for certain
collective activities such as water harvesting. Any development program and intervening agency
facilitating collective action in such societies where culture plays a great role in cooperation
needs to identify and examine the type of group action for which substitutability of one asset for
the other will encourage and maintain involvement of poor members.
Although members try to organize themselves and coordinate collective action, the external
support in providing technological facilities is necessary to increase benefits from collectively
produced good. The objective of the state in enabling the community to secure food through
collective action depends on the extent to which it provides such assistance.
At present, low level of participation is a result of environmental uncertainty rather than a
differential impact of institutions, which we expect it to affect members‘benefit differently. This12
implies that we should not undermine the technical capacity of groups in organizing collective
action by heavily emphasizing on the institutional dimension.
 References
Ahn, T. K., Ostrom, E. and Walker, J.M. (2003). Heterogeneous preferences and collective action. Public
Choice 117:295-314.
Baland, J. and Platteau, J. (2002). Collective action and the commons: the role of inequality. In J.M.
Baland, P. Bardhan and S. Bowles (eds.) 'Inequality, Cooperation and Environmental
Sustainability’. Centre for Research and Economic Development, University of Namur, Belgium.
May 2002.
Barrett, C.R. and Lee, D. R. (2004). Institutional Arrangements for rural poverty reduction and resource
conservation. World Development 33(2): 193-197.
Bastiaensen, J., De Herdt, T.and D’Exelle, B. (2005). Poverty reduction as a local institutional process.
World Development 33(6): 979-993.
Fekadu, B., Bekele, T. and Zergaw, L. (2001).  Socio-economic and Resource Base Assessment Survey in
the Somali National Regional State, Shinille Ecosystem: With reference to Pastoral, Agro-pastoral
and Sedentary Farming Systems. Study Report. Alemaya University. Ethiopia.
Gebre, Ayalew (2001). Pastoralism Under Pressure: Land Alienation and Pastoral transformation among
the Karrayu of Eastern Ethiopia, 1941 to Present. Shaker Publishing. 415 pp.
Grootaert, C. and Narayan, D. (2004). Local institutions, poverty and household welfare in Bolivia. World
Development 32(7): 1179-1198.
Hardin, R. (1982). Collective Action. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.  264  pp.
Kassa, Getachew  (2001). Among the pastoral Afar in Ethiopia: Tradition, continuity and socio-economic
change. International Books. 200 pp.13
Knox, A., Meinzen-Dick, R. and Hazell,  P. (1998). Property Rights, Collective Action and Technologies
for Natural Resource Management. SP-PRCA Working Paper No. 1.  IFPRI.
Lin, J.F. and Nugent, J.B. (1995). Institutions and Economic Development. Handbook of Development
Economics, Volume III. Elsevier Science, pp.2303 – 2363.
McCarthy, N. (2004). Collective action and Property Rights for Sustainable Development: Local-level
public goods and collective action. 2020 Vision. IFPRI Briefing paper.
Meinzen-Dick, R., Pradhan, R. and Gregorio, M. D. (2004). Collective action and Property rights for
Sustainable Development: Understanding property rights. IFPRI 2020 Vision. Focus 11.
Meinzen-Dick, R., Gregorio, M. D. and McCarthy, N. (2004). Methods for Studying Collective action in
Rural Development.  Agricultural Systems 82(3): 197-214.
Nagido, T. and Kirk, M. (2001). Collective action, property rights and devolution of rangeland
management: selected examples from Africa and Asia. In: Meinzen-Dick, R.;Knox, A.; Gregorio,
M.D. (eds) Collective action, property rights and Devolution of Natural Resource Management:
Exchange of knowledge and Implications for Policy. Conference proceedings. Philippines.  21-25,
June 1999.
Olson, M. (1965). The logic of collective action: Public goods and the theory of groups. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press. 186 pp.
Ostrom, E. (2005). The Complexity of Collective Action Theory. Paper presented at the conference on
Analyzing Problems of Polycentric Governance in the growing EU. Berlin, 16-17 June 2005.
Ostrom, E. (2003). How types of goods and property rights jointly affect collective action. Journal of
Theoretical Politics 15(3):239-270.
Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the Commons: the evolution of institutions for collective action. Cambridge
University Press.  280 pp.
Place, F. and Swallow, B. (2000). Assessing the Relationships between Property Rights and Technology
Adoption in Smallholder Agriculture: A Review of Issues and Empirical Methods. CAPRi Working
Paper 2. IFPRI.14
Runge, C.R. (1986). Common Property and Collective Action in Economic Development. World
Development 14(5): 623-635.